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Abstract:  
Identity and its management is now an integral part of web based services 
and applications. It is also a live political issue that has captured the 
interest of organisations, businesses and society generally. High profile 
security breaches, the spread of online criminality and identity theft have 
led to increased focus on the design and implementation of sound identity 
management systems. Virtualisation of data not only raises issues 
concerning security. As identity management systems assume functionally 
equivalent roles like authentication, accreditation and determining access, 
their significance for privacy cannot be underestimated. The Center for 
Democracy & Technology (CDT) has recently released a draft version1 of 
what it regards as key privacy principles for identity management in the 
digital age. This paper will provide an overview of the key benchmarks 
identified by the CDT. The focus of this paper is to explore how best the 
Data Protection legislation can be said to provide a framework which best 
maintains a proper balance between “identity” conscious technology and 
an individual’s expectation of privacy to personal and sensitive data. The 
central argument will be that increased compliance with key principles is 
not only appropriate for a distributed privacy environment but will go 
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some way towards creating a space for various stakeholders to reach 
consensus relating to the standards applicable to existing and new 
information communication technologies. The Data Protection legislation 
provides the basis for achieving an optimal balance between security and 
privacy concerns. The conclusion however is that securing compliance 
with the legislation will prove to be the biggest governance challenge –
standard setting and norms will go some way to ease the need for 
centralized regulatory oversight.
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1. Introduction
We have developed a range of measures and solutions to prove and 
even manage our identity well before the onset of the Internet. How we 
manage identity, address issues of authorisation, access and integrity is 
also context dependent. This is not to suggest a form of technological 
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determinism in our attitudes toward identity management. Rather, it is 
intended to emphasise the values that we regard as being inalienable that 
will in turn be instrumental in shaping the technological and design 
solutions we have at our disposal. Consider the following account, as an 
illustration of one of the unresolved tensions relating to the management 
of identity in the digital age. Government agencies collect, process and 
store personal information to enable them to provide services and fulfill 
their statutory obligations. Law enforcement agencies access to 
information on private individuals to deal with security threats and public 
order issues. Personal internet security has become a live political issue in 
most countries. As collection, processing and distribution of data becomes 
decentralized, individuals are now finding that their expectations of 
privacy and control are now the subject of public interest goals. The 
reasons for the contestation to an individual’s claim to manage his or her 
identity is not difficult to fathom. The Internet is also becoming a 
playground of criminals. Criminals are using sophisticated technologies to 
facilitate a range of criminal activities. The “Internet Security Threat 
Report” issued on September 17, 20072 describes the increased use of 
technologies to facilitate identity theft, and the acquisition of personal and 
sensitive information. The Anti-Phishing Working Group, noted that 25, 
683 unique phishing reports were received in December 2007.  Securing 
trust is now a priority. Access to and control of personal data by 
businesses and organisations is regarded as critical to maintaining 
consumer and business confidence in the online environment.  ‘Identity 
management’, for the purposes of this work, is broadly concerned with the 
range of technologies that are used to manage ‘data’ relating to the 
attributes or characteristics of a person or a subject and which are relied 
upon when dealing with a person’s credentials and rights to access. The 
infrastructures currently available on the market deal with a range of 
matters already familiar to us in the offline environment: authentication 
and access. A key feature of evolving identity management technologies 
is that the applications have embedded identity conscious software. The 
exponential growth in the market for identity management software 
reflects the concerns of organisations, businesses, governments and their 
agencies of the importance of providing greater security for information 
and the trust implications that accompany breaches or abuse of data. The 
concern is particularly acute as many mechanisms for data collection, 
storage and distribution are also automated. In short, the management of 
identity is now regarded as an integral part of securing web based services 
and applications. As identity management systems assume functional 
roles which erode the public and private space, privacy issues and the 
values we regard as being inalienable have to be considered. The 
controversy surrounding Facebook’s use of the Beacon system4 and more 
generally the use by social networking sites of personal information 
without the consent of individuals illustrates why any trade-offs between 
greater security and privacy must be subjected to regulatory oversight –
the aim ultimately is to maintain an optimal balance between the 
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competing and at times conflicting interests. The key question that this 
paper addresses is what principles can industry and policymakers turn to 
when seeking to respond to security concerns whilst reflecting the values 
underpinned by the Data Protection legislation. We now have one set of 
principles which can assist businesses and identity management service 
providers. The Center for Democracy & Technology has recently released 
a draft version5 of what it regards as key privacy principles for identity 
management in the digital age. This paper will provide an overview of the 
key benchmarks identified by the CDT. The focus of this paper is to 
explore how best the Data Protection Legislation can be said to provide a 
framework to ensure that a proper balance is maintained between 
“identity” conscious technology and an individual’s expectation of 
privacy to personal and sensitive data. The Data Protection legislation 
provides the basis for achieving a balanced framework. The conclusion 
however is that securing compliance with the DPD will prove to be the 
biggest governance challenge – standard setting and norms will go some 
way to ease the need for centralized regulatory oversight.
2. Identity Management in Web 2.0
Imagine the life cycle of an individual’s identity during the course of 
the day. He or she may login to his Internet service provider, run a range 
of applications, make purchases online, access social network sites and 
email accounts. A vast amount of information is likely to created by the 
individual – the content will reflect the multiple identities of the 
individual. The information may relate to the individual’s status: a 
customer with a bank, a consumer, a user of products and services. The 
information may also relate to matters of reputation and intimacy.  The 
operating system platforms and web applications will each have their own 
identity management processes. This individual may also be an employee 
of an organisation with the following authenticating system:6
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Figure 1: Identity and Access Management Infrastructure
The individual’s ‘identity’ in this context is managed by the 
infrastructure set in place by the organisation. For example, data relating 
to the individual’s identity is stored in a centralised directory. ‘Identity 
aware’ tools enable the organisation to determine access requests from the 
individual, undertake authentication and implement controls over the 
identity transactions. Updates or modifications to the individual’s identity 
can also be addressed by the provisioning service component. For 
example, changes in bank account details, or expiry of access privileges 
or amendments to these can be addressed. It is customary to provide the 
user with a personalized platform interface so that relevant inputs can be 
made. Notwithstanding the usefulness of these innovations, an individual 
has multiple identities. The fact that the individual is employed by an 
organisation does not assist him when negotiating other identity related 
transactions. There are numerous instances of transactions requiring of the 
individual other attributes or digital identity. For example, a smart card 
that permits the individual to access the car park or building can be said to 
be concerned with one aspect of an identity, and could not similarly be 
used to purchase airline tickets online or books from an online publisher. 
An individual’s identity can take a number of life cycles – sometimes 
having no connection with each other. The following illustrates the 
possession of ‘trust constituting’ credentials. 
Figure 2: Ing Direct: Login
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Identity management is not purely a security matter – it also involves 
managing expectations between the collector and the user. 
What do these two examples of a hypothetical life cycle tell us about 
the deep seated tensions between ‘security’ and ‘privacy? More 
importantly, how do we begin to construct a set of principles that provides 
a legitimate and pragmatic solution to the governance challenges? The 
former question can be quickly answered.
First, digitalised data processed by automated systems carry the risk of 
unauthorised persons gaining access to personal and sensitive data
belonging to an individual. Second, there is no regulatory oversight both 
in respect of the collection and storage of data in identity management 
systems or for that matter ensuring that the data is not subsequently used 
for purposes without the consent of the individual. In both instances, 
issues of accountability, transparency and integrity needed to be 
confronted at the design, application and substantive level. It is beyond 
the scope of the objectives of this paper to deal with the architectural 
issues. But these issues can be addressed obliquely in the following 
illustration.
Consider as an example the governance challenges that stem from the 
fact that the data transmitted by 1.3 billion online users can be potentially 
tracked, manipulated and used by data controllers.7 Yahoo Inc, for 
example, is reputed to make 110 billion collections on its web sites and 
also an estimated 1,709 other opportunities for collection at its disposal 
from sites where it has advertisement placements.8 Data is commercially 
and strategically valuable. Companies such as AOL and Microsoft are 
positioning themselves to acquire online data silos. Google has received 
approval from the EU authorities over its proposed acquisition of 
DoubleClink Inc. DoubleClick Performics, which is the performance-
based marketing division of DoubleClick Inc, provides online marketing 
services and technologies for multimedia marketers.9 Its data collection 
strategy is designed to provide its clients with a comprehensive 
understanding of customers’ knowledge and use of the Internet. Issues of 
interoperability and security now compete with the growing recognition 
of the commercial value of leveraging personal information. 
The examples regarding the employment and the financial transactions 
and the value of data in one respect draws our attention to the relationship 
between an enterprise’s needs and goals and the IT infrastructures that are 
instituted. The Yahoo example illustrates the broader context within 
which identity management issues operate. 
Three observations can now be made before we address the issues 
raised by the guidelines issued by the CDT. First, we have multiple 
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identities. Second, identity management raises an important issue about 
the end-to-end architecture of the Internet. There is no identity layer. 
Digital identity is not readily amenable to a set of meta data or for that 
matter an agreed set of protocols that can be configured as a form of 
‘identity layer’. Third, as Kim Cameron10 observes, the lack of agreement 
in terms of designing a meta-system for identity management reflects the 
fact there are complex trade-offs between identity, trust, security and 
convenience. The maintenance of trust, it is suggested, is an important 
aspect of data governance and identity management. The threats posed by 
privacy invasive technologies to trust and confidence is not new of course. 
As the World Summit on the Information Society noted:11
Strengthening the trust framework, including information security 
and network security, authentication, privacy and consumer 
protection, is a prerequisite for the development of the Information 
Society and for building confidence among users of ICTs. A global 
culture of cyber-security needs to be promoted, developed and 
implemented in cooperation with all stakeholders and international 
expert bodies. These efforts should be supported by increased 
international cooperation. Within this global culture of cyber-
security, it is important to enhance security and to ensure the 
protection of data and privacy, while enhancing access and trade. 
In addition, it must take into account the level of social and 
economic development of each country and respect the 
development-oriented aspects of the Information Society.
That said, identity management systems require us to reassess the 
privacy values we regard as being inalienable and challenges us to find 
optimal solutions to emerging governance challenges posed. How do we 
ensure that the systems of identity reflect the complexity and granularity 
of ‘data’ and multiple identities? The CDT identifies a set of principles 
that regards ‘norms’ rather than centralised regulatory frameworks as 
being the mechanism through which standards can emerge. The principles 
identified by the CDT12 are consistent with the prevailing regulatory 
attitude towards the design of infrastructures that seek to maintain a 
balance between the creation of a robust system of identity management 
and privacy management. The publication of the privacy principles are, 
according to the CDT, aimed at government and commercial entities ‘in 
developing programs or systems for the creation, authentication and use 
of identity.’ The principles are divided into two categories: the umbrella 
principles of diversity and decentralisation, proportionality and 
architecture; and specific fair information practices, namely, purpose and 
use, notice, choice, security, accountability, access, and data quality.
A few words of explanation are needed to understand the CDT 
principles.  
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According to the principle of proportionality, the amount and type of 
information collected or stored by an identity system should be 
proportionate to the purpose for which the identity is created. Therefore, 
information that is collected beyond the purposes for which it was 
originally obtained would not be regarded as being proportionate. 
Similarly, information that has been obtained, but is subsequently used for 
another purpose without obtaining the user’s consent can also be viewed 
as disproportionate. An example is R v Department of Health ex parte 
Source Informatics (1999) 52 BMLR 65 (CA) whereby patients’ data in 
anonymised form were provided (without personal identifiers) to a 
pharmaceutical company Source Informatics without the patient’s 
consent. Although the case dealt with the common law of confidence and 
whether personal information in anonymised form fell within the ambit of 
the common law of confidence, the processing of the data for other uses
than was originally obtained could be argued to be disproportionate.13
The principle of diversity and decentralization is intended to illustrate 
the point that identity systems should be designed to exist in a 
marketplace offering multiple services that deliver varying degrees and 
kinds of identity creation, authentication and use. The CDT gave an 
example that accessing a health record would be different from accessing 
an e-mail account. This hinges on giving the consumer a choice. There is 
no similar principle under the current European Data Protection 
Framework.
On the principle of individual control and choice, this reflects the aim 
of enabling individuals to have to have reasonable control and choice over 
the attributes, identifiers and credentials that can be used within the 
identity systems.
As for notice and consent, individuals should be given a clear 
statement about the collection and use of identifying information. Again, 
this is similar to the European Data Protection Framework which requires 
an individual’s unambiguous consent before personal data can be 
processed or an individual’s explicit consent in the case of sensitive 
personal data (as defined under Art. 8(1) of the Data Protection Directive 
95/46/EC).
The principle of limited use needs no further explanation. Personal 
information should only be used for specific, limited and disclosed 
purposes. 
Regarding the principle of onward transfer,  the CDT provides that 
‘any organization that handles identity information should include in its 
contracts provisions requiring that the entities with which identity 
information and linked information is shared will afford that shared data a 
level of protection consistent with or exceeding the organization’s own 
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standards, consistent with these principles.’ This principle is slightly 
different from the principle of transborder data flows as provided under 
Art. 25 of the Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC, which prohibits the 
transfer of personal data to non-EEA countries without an adequate level 
of protection (which can be satisfied by a Commission ruling to this effect 
or through binding corporate rules agreed by the company concerned). 
What would be clearer is the destination to which the personal data is 
transferred, and the likely remedies for the misuse of personal data 
transferred. The authors will discuss this in the context of the European 
Data Protection Framework.
The principle of privacy and security by design refers to factors that 
should be considered into an identity system including safeguards for the 
physical system components and policies and procedures that guide the 
implementation of the system.
Finally, the principles of security, accountability and access, data 
quality and due process are understandable without further discussion.
We can simplify the CDT statement of intent by reconceptualising the 
governance issue raised by identity management in the following terms. 
First, the design and implementation of identity management systems 
must be alive to considerations of efficiency. Users are unlikely to 
respond positively if the system requires excessive information and/or if 
there are interoperability issues, as might be the case if a user has to 
memorise a number of usernames and passwords. Second, the managing 
identity is about managing expectations and sustaining trust relationships. 
As Microsoft discovered, identity management must be user-centric and 
negative perceptions of the Identity service provider can impair the 
adoption of the technology.14 Third, implementation of strategies must not 
overlook the fact that data cycles may have a life span and are always 
subjected to change. Flexibility, audit and updating are critical to ensure 
that a user is not denied his access rights. User control, and the 
amenability of identity management systems to next generation 
applications are an integral part in the creation of norms that become 
mainstream in the online community. Identity management is not an issue 
that can be divorced from the broader goal of the Information Society. 
Paragraph 44 for example notes that:
Standardization is one of the essential building blocks of the 
Information Society. There should be particular emphasis on the 
development and adoption of international standards. The 
development and use of open, interoperable, non-discriminatory 
and demand-driven standards that take into account needs of users 
and consumers is a basic element for the development and greater 
diffusion of ICTs and more affordable access to them, particularly 
in developing countries. International standards aim to create an 
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environment where consumers can access services worldwide 
regardless of underlying technology.
Finally, the evolution of a user-centric identity management system is 
also dependent on service providers not only creating sound and secure 
systems but that efforts are made to inculcate in users an awareness that 
identity management is everyone’s responsibility. Norms and standards 
take time to evolve and any successful outcome will require the issues 
raised by the ‘security’-‘privacy’ dimension are identified and addressed 
in an impartial and objective manner. There have been a range of standard 
setting initiatives. The Markup Language for service provisioning 
provides standards for request and response and message exchanges 
(SPML).15 A number of identity management service providers have 
provided security assertion markup language (SAML).16 Organisations 
utilise these mechanisms for exchanging trust constituting credentials. 
The eXtensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML) is an 
encoded data exchange standard enabling organisastions to enforce access 
control policies. 17 The Liberty Alliance Project has been at the forefront 
of standard setting initiatives and particularly prominent in developing 
federated identity management services.18 Standards for security token 
formats have resulted in the development of WS-* specifications and 
which have been supported by major identity management service 
providers like Microsoft and IBM.19 A number of user-centric identity 
management initiatives are emerging: Light-Weight Identity (LID), 
OpenID and Yadis (Yet Another Decentralized Interoperability System.20
The growing complexity of the web based services and applications,  the 
emergence of the open source commons has important implications for 
the future of standard setting initiatives. Clearly there will need to be a 
threshold, where issues of security, privacy and convenience are 
negotiated. Single sign-ons (sso), auditing processes, and securing 
compliance with established privacy or data protection policies will 
ensure that minimal standards are maintained.
What follows below is an examination of the value of the EDPF as a 
standard setting framework for identity management which respects 
privacy principles.21
3. European Data Protection Framework
The European Data Protection Framework is good starting point to 
address the key critical issues as applied to the digital age. Although the 
Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC (“DPD”) was enacted before the 
internet became the main medium for communication, the Directive has 
since been supplemented by the Directive on Privacy and Electronic 
Communications 2002/58/EC. The latter complements the DPD and 
applies to the processing of personal data in the electronic 
communications sector.
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By way of background, the DPD was originally modelled on the 
Council of Europe Convention for the Protection of Individuals with 
regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data (also influenced by the 
OECD), and its objective was to harmonise the data protection laws 
within the European Union. The main data protection principles can be 
found in Art. 6: 
1. Member States shall provide that personal data must be:
(a) processed fairly and lawfully;
(b) collected for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes and not further 
processed in a way incompatible with those purposes. Further processing of 
data for historical, statistical or scientific purposes shall not be considered as 
incompatible provided that Member States provide appropriate safeguards;
(c) adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the purposes for which 
they are collected and/or further processed;
(d) accurate and, where necessary, kept up to date; every reasonable step 
must be taken to ensure that data which are inaccurate or incomplete, having 
regard to the purposes for which they were collected or for which they are 
further processed, are erased or rectified;
(e) kept in a form which permits identification of data subjects for no longer 
than is necessary for the purposes for which the data were collected or for 
which they are further processed. Member States shall lay down appropriate 
safeguards for personal data stored for longer periods for historical, 
statistical or scientific use.
2. It shall be for the controller to ensure that paragraph 1 is complied with.
The definition of “personal data” is interpreted broadly under Art. 2(a) 
to encompass ‘any information relating to an identified or identifiable 
natural person.’ The Directive does not include legal persons, but 
countries including Austria, Italy, Luxembourg have extended their data 
protection laws to legal persons (Korff, 2002). The European Court of 
Justice’s decision in Lindqvist further confirms the broad scope of this 
definition in its judgment:
The act of referring, on an internet page, to various persons and 
identifying them by name or by other means, for instance by giving 
their telephone number or information regarding their working 
conditions and hobbies, constitutes the processing of personal data
wholly or partly by automatic means within the meaning of Article 
3(1) of Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with 
regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement 
of such data.
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The Directive places emphasis on the data controller(s) to ensure that 
the data protection rules are followed. Where special categories of 
personal data are involved (Art. 8(1) defines this as personal data 
revealing racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or 
philosophical beliefs, trade-union membership, and the processing of data 
concerning health or sex life), there are additional requirements laid down 
under Art. 8(2) before processing can take place. For example, processing 
sensitive data is permitted if the data subject gives his explicit consent. 
Explicit consent is not defined in the Directive, but consent is given a 
wide definition under Art. 2(h) as ‘any freely given specific and informed 
indication of his wishes by which the data subject signifies his agreement 
to personal data relating to him being processed.’ Germany has 
interpreted “explicit consent” to refer to written consent. UK, however, 
does not specifically require that consent be written and that implied 
consent, may, under specific circumstances be allowed. There is no 
uniform consensus amongst EU countries on this.  Consent by silence, 
however, will not satisfy this requirement. This leads onto the next 
question whether identity management systems can adequately obtain the 
consent of the individual? Is the data subject aware that his personal 
information is being used for specified purposes? As I have argued in an 
earlier paper (2007), the application of sensitive data on the internet or 
even on computerized databases raises significant problems because an 
individual’s name may reveal his/her ethnicity and thus, a higher standard 
of care is required to process this data. Secondly, data may become 
sensitive according to its context. For example, a list of individuals’ 
names that when combined with other personal information shows that 
they belong to a trade union. The Directive does not address this for 
understandable reasons (considering the background of the Directive). 
However, it is an anomaly that the Directive on Privacy and Electronic 
Communications 2002/58/EC does not also tackle this issue, leaving the 
onus upon data controllers to decide what standards apply ie. Art. 7 
(normal data) or Art. 8 (sensitive data). One should look at the 
contextualised approach when approaching the processing of sensitive 
data (Simitis, 2007) such that data could become sensitive data according 
to its context (Wong, 2007). A pressing issue is the transfer of personal 
data (normally referred to as “transborder data flows”) in accordance with 
Art. 25 of the Data Protection Directive:
1. The Member States shall provide that the transfer to a third country of 
personal data which are undergoing processing or are intended for 
processing after transfer may take place only if, without prejudice to 
compliance with the national provisions adopted pursuant to the other 
provisions of this Directive, the third country in question ensures an 
adequate level of protection,
2. The adequacy of the level of protection afforded by a third country shall 
be assessed in the light of all the circumstances surrounding a data 
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transfer operation or set of data transfer operations; particular 
consideration shall be given to the nature of the data, the purpose and 
duration of the proposed processing operation or operations, the country 
of origin and country of final destination, the rules of law, both general 
and sectoral, in force in the third country in question and the 
professional rules and security measures which are complied with in that 
country.
3. The Member States and the Commission shall inform each other of 
cases where they consider that a third country does not ensure an 
adequate level of protection within the meaning of paragraph 2.
4. Where the Commission finds, under the procedure provided for in 
Article 31 (2), that a third country does not ensure an adequate level of 
protection within the meaning of paragraph 2 of this Article, Member 
States shall take the measures necessary to prevent any transfer of data 
of the same type to the third country in question.
5. At the appropriate time, the Commission shall enter into negotiations 
with a view to remedying the situation resulting from the finding made 
pursuant to paragraph 4.
6. The Commission may find, in accordance with the procedure referred to 
in Article 31 (2), that a third country ensures an adequate level of 
protection within the meaning of paragraph 2 of this Article, by reason 
of its domestic law or of the international commitments it has entered 
into, particularly upon conclusion of the negotiations referred to in 
paragraph 5, for the protection of the private lives and basic freedoms 
and rights of individuals.
Member States shall take the measures necessary to comply with the 
Commission's decision.
This is relevant because personal information is regularly transferred 
by multinational companies beyond national borders to non-EEA 
countries such as India and China. Under those circumstances, the 
Directive requires that the transfer of personal information can only take 
place where the adequate standards are met:
The adequacy of the level of protection afforded by a third country 
shall be assessed in the light of all the circumstances surrounding a 
data transfer operation or set of data transfer operations; particular 
consideration shall be given to the nature of the data, the purpose 
and duration of the proposed processing operation or operations, 
the country of origin and country of final destination, the rules of 
law, both general and sectoral, in force in the third country in 
question and the professional rules and security measures which are 
complied with in that country.
Currently, India does not have data protection laws, but they have 
amended the India Information Technology Act 200422 to address the 
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question of off-shore processing of personal data. China is set to 
introduce privacy laws in 2008,23 but whether this will be modelled on the 
European Data Protection Framework is less than clear.
4. The Directive on Privacy and Electronic 
Communications 2002/58/EC and the Data Retentions 
Directive 2006/24/EC
This leads to the next question on the application of Directive on 
Privacy and Electronic Communications 2002/58/EC and the Data 
Retentions Directive 2006/24/EC.
The Directive on Privacy and Electronic Communications 
complements the existing DPD and applies to ‘providers of a publicly 
available electronic communications services in public communications 
networks in the Community’. This could be an internet service provider; 
mobile or telephone operator(s) using a publicly available electronic 
communications service. The key words are “publicly available” and 
therefore, private networks such as intranets could fall outside the scope 
of the DPEC.   In the context of identity management systems, it would be 
quite difficult to identify that an identity management system data 
controller was also a provider of electronic communications services. 
However, in a hypothetical example, where an identity management 
systems data controller that was also providing internet access (as an 
internet service provider), then they may fall within the scope of Art. 3 
(and is not simply a private network). On the basis that the identity 
management system data controller was a provider of publicly available 
communications service, they would be required to adopt technical and 
organisational measures as provided under Art. 4.1 DPEC. This states that 
‘publicly available electronic communications service must take 
appropriate technical and organisational measures to safeguard security of 
its services, if necessary in conjunction with the provider of the public 
communications networks with respect to network security.’  Art. 4.2 
further states ‘that the provider of a public available electronic 
communications service must inform the subscribers concerning such risk 
and, where the risk lies outside the scope of the measures to be taken by 
the service provider, of any possible remedies, including an indication of 
the likely costs involved.’  This provision emphasises the CDT principle 
concerning the privacy and security of the system. The ISO standards/IEC 
17799 is a recognised international standard that could be adopted by 
identity management system data controllers. The other provisions within 
the DPEC are not applicable in the context of Identity Management 
System Data Controllers and are therefore not considered in this article.
Finally, the Data Retentions Directive 2006/24/EC (DRD)24 further 
adds another dimension to the Data Protection framework. The DRD 
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requires that providers of publicly available electronic communications
services or of publicly communications network retain the data of the 
subscriber or registered user for a minimum of six months to a maximum 
period of two years from the date of the communication (Art. 6 DPD).  
Again, it would need to be shown that an identity management data 
controller was a provider of publicly available electronic communications 
service.  Users are defined under Art. 2(b) as ‘any legal entity or natural 
person using a publicly available electronic communications services, for 
private or business purposes, without necessarily having subscribed to that 
service.’ The types of data to be retained are categorised under Art. 5.  
What is of more relevance is Art. 5(1)(a) data necessary to trace and 
identify the source of a communication; Art. 5(1)(b) data necessary to 
identify the destination of a communication; Art. 5(1)(c)(2) data necessary 
to identify the date, time and duration of a communication concerning 
internet access, internet e-mail and internet telephony. Member States 
could, by virtue of Art. 15.3 postpone the application of the retention of 
communications data relating to internet access, internet telephony and 
internet e-mail until 15 March 2009. Some of the Member States 
including the UK have postponed the retention of this data until then (see 
Art. 15.3 of the DRD).
It should be added that the DRD does not require the provider to retain 
the content of the communication (Art. 5.2 DRD) but rather the data to be 
retained originates, date identified, time and duration of the 
communication. A further provision is made of Art. 7 on the data security 
principles to be adopted. 
The Data Protection framework (through the DPD, DPEC and the 
DRD) which has been implemented by individual Member States25
complement the identity principles referred to above. The identity 
principles, however, further reinforces the notion of the identity of the 
individual through the use of identity management systems. However, 
there are a few notable differences. The Data Protection Framework 
provides remedies to individuals against organisations or individuals (as 
“data controllers”) for not adhering to the DPD or the DPEC The 
application of the DPD is fairly broad with each Member State having 
implemented the DPD26 and the DPEC into their own national laws. 
Furthermore, the Data Protection Authorities oversees the application of 
the data protection laws within their own Member States. 
5. Improving the CDT Principles 
The CDT principles would complement the Data Protection 
Framework, in providing clearer guidelines on what identity management 
data controllers would need to do to protect the identity of individuals. A 
further issue is the protection of multiple identities of an individual, who 
may be known as X in one identity management system, but may be 
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known by a pseudonym in another identity management system. It was 
acknowledged by the CDT’s paper on Privacy Principles for Identity in 
the Digital Age that in a ‘networked world the urge to link identity 
systems and databases together will always exist…Linking should occur 
in cases where its specific benefits exceed the associated privacy and 
security risks. When linking is deemed necessary, strong safeguards
should be erected to ensure that unnecessary linkages do not occur
(emphasis added).’
The subject of multiple identities is not specifically addressed in the 
DPD, but the notion of “personal data” under the DPD is sufficiently 
broad to encompass any ‘information relating to an identified or 
identifiable natural person’ and thus, multiple identities would fall within 
the scope of the DPD.
The CDT principles could be strengthened if these principles were not 
only embraced by identity management system data controllers, but also 
there was a body overseeing the application of these principles. The work 
of the Data Protection Authorities could be a starting point not only in 
highlighting the national data protection laws that apply, but also how it 
applies to identity management systems at a European level.27
6. Conclusion
As identified in this paper, the CDT principles are a good starting point
when tackling the collection and storage of personal information held in 
identity management systems. The question is the application of identity 
management systems to the online environment. Art. 4 of the DPD is
fairly clear about the application of data protection laws in particular 
domestic settings. That said, practical and conceptual issues may have to 
be confronted when  identity system management systems co-exist in 
Member States and non--EEA jurisdictions. In addition to the choice of 
law issues, the mechanisms for securing compliance with established data 
protection principles must be put in place.  In which case, each Member 
State’s data protection laws could be applicable or in the case of non-EEA 
data controllers that make use of “equipment” to process personal data 
unless this was used for transit purposes. The over-reaching effect of the 
Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC to non-EEA data controllers does lay 
itself to particular difficulties in terms of enforcement. Under those 
circumstances, the work of the National Data Protection Commissioners 
would be a good starting point. The European Data Protection Framework 
is, however, relevant when considering whether personal information held 
in Identity Management Systems is collected within Europe. The Data 
Protection Directive places an onus on EU data controllers to adhere with 
the relevant national data protection laws that apply. Oversight of the Data 
Protection Laws is further supported by the work of the European Data 
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Protection Authorities. The issue is not whether there is the legislative 
framework to support the protection of an individual’s identity in identity 
management systems. The current framework can provide the support and 
the necessary remedies (in instances of breach) for individuals whose 
personal information (be it in the form of profiles or pseudnonyms) are 
held on these systems. An important factor will be how robust these 
systems are in securing the personal information of individuals and the 
choice provided for individuals to control their own identity. Art. 17 of 
the Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC lays emphasis on the technical 
and security measures adopted by data controllers, but other than security 
measures, user awareness and the ease with which their profiles are easily 
managed from identity management system will be an important factor. 
Furthermore, it should also be added that the data protection principles 
laid down under the Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC should continue 
to be upheld but as Peter Hustinx, the European Data Protection 
Supervisor28 indicated, when considering the existing Data Protection 
Framework, it is not existing data protection principles that need to 
change, but rather how the Data Protection Framework could be made 
more effective. There is still some way to go over the protection of 
identity. It is not so much as regulation, but rather a clearer understanding 
over the broad application of the current European data protection 
framework. The CDT goes some way to demonstrate how this will work.  
The challenge is for Data Protection Authorities to take this onboard and 
ensure that there is sufficient guidance for industry and consumers alike.  
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